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Inside Washington

SALT II Threatened by Iranian Revolution

The Khomeini revolution in Iran is not only going to affect our policy in the Middle East, but it certainly will have a bearing on that strategic arms limitation agreement that the U.S. is negotiating with the Soviet Union.

President Carter has repeatedly said that he won't enter into a settlement with the Soviets that isn't verifiable. But if Khomeini has his way—or some left-wing successor who is likely to replace him—the U.S. will be deprived of critical monitoring facilities in Iran.

Gen. Daniel Graham, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told HUMAN EVENTS last week that Administration claims that the loss of the Iranian capability won't make any difference because we can transfer that capability to Turkey is "essentially fraudulent."

Moving the Iranian facilities, he said, "would take years" and it wouldn't make any difference anyway, because the Caucasus mountain range across from Turkey would be in the way.

The radar and signal collection capabilities in Iran, Graham pointed out, "are located in such a way that they overlook two of the most important



KHOMEINI



GRAHAM

Soviet installations: the head of the intercontinental ballistic missile range at Tyura Tam and the test range for Soviet anti-ballistic missile activities at Sary Shagan. And there is no way that this capability can be transplanted to Turkey."

But our position could be even worse, said Graham. A former CIA employee, William Kampiles, was recently convicted of turning over to the Soviets the KH-11 manual, a technical volume describing the workings of our most advanced reconnaissance instrument, a huge photographic sky lab capable of filming missile sites in great detail from altitudes of 100 miles and more. Because of Kampiles' betrayal, the Soviets will now be able to devise methods to elude our spy lab.

"In my view," said Graham, "the loss of facilities in Iran, coupled with the loss of the manuals on our prime photographing satellite, KH-11, means you won't be able to verify SALT I, let alone SALT II."

what U.S. technology can do even without Iran—a we're-from-Missouri-too display including some classified samples of the latest in CIA sky-spying photography.

"We have to answer the question, 'Can we trust the Russians?'" says one White House lobbyist on the SALT beat. "Our answer is we don't *have* to trust them."

■ **THE MUSCLE QUESTION.** The Administration must likewise lay to rest the suspicion that SALT II will somehow compromise America's military capability—a mission Carter himself will take up in a bullish we're-number-one speech at Georgia Tech next week. He has partly prepared the way by giving the Pentagon a healthy inflation-plus-3 per cent raise in his otherwise skinflinty budget for fiscal 1980, and will make much of the enduring U.S. technological edge over the Russians as well. His people professed unconcern even at the recent news that the Soviets have developed a cruise missile, till then a U.S. monopoly. "The son of a bitch is as big as a boxcar," says a senior Georgian, "and has one unusual characteristic—it dives into the ground every 100 feet."

The answers come easier to the White House than the votes. Its eve-of-battle tally—40 ayes, 20 nays, 40 up for grabs—is considered generous on the Hill, and even then requires the Administration to split the uncommitted bloc two for one just to squeak in. Neither have Carter's people found much cheer in the early intelligence on the four senators they think will cast the bellwether ballots: Baker, Majority Leader Robert Byrd, and defense specialists Henry M. (Scoop) Jackson of Washington and Sam Nunn of Georgia. "If we lose any two of those, it's difficult to see how SALT can be ratified," one tactician says. But a Senate staffer close to Jackson dismissed the treaty last week as "lousy," and the White House reads Baker as leaning against it—unless he can share the glory with, say, some last-minute stiffening riders.

'Work Plan': Against those odds, Carter's operatives have laid on a strenuous sales effort—so strenuous that they worry *en famille* about being accused of "the Rafshooning of SALT." The effort bumped along by fits and starts through December, held back by the absence of a treaty to sell. But with the new year, a wave of do-something messages from SALT's friends on the Hill moved Carter to open the throttle. By mid-January, Hamilton Jordan, architect of the Panama Canal victory last year, got the boss's go-ahead on a thick "SALT Work Plan" of similar design—a blueprint for stroking senators in Washington and lighting grass fires of support back home. By last week, Carter's SALT sellers had lobbied more than half the Senate, and were dating up the rest. Said one: "They're going to be briefed to the point where they're tired of it."

The cheering fact for the White House was that it had started much farther behind in the Panama fight. "Only 2 per cent of the people favored the treaties when we began," one veteran kids, "and they all worked for the Carter Administration." But the coming debate over SALT is likely to be a longer, nastier, more closely contested battle with far higher stakes: the future course of U.S.-Soviet relations—and quite possibly the fate of Jimmy Carter's Presidency.

—PETER GOLDMAN with ELEANOR CLIFT, THOMAS M. DeFRANK, JOHN J. LINDSAY and JAMES DOYLE in Washington